Earlier this week, the Pentagon delivered to the U.S. Congress a congressionally mandated report on the status of the war in Afghanistan. The report acknowledges the Taliban perceive 2009 as their most successful year of operations to date and believe they will be able to sustain their efforts in 2010.
Part of this public report to Congress is about expectations management, especially as the outcome of the new American strategy is still in question. As we noted in our weekly update on the status of the war, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is struggling to consolidate gains in Marjah and win the population over.
While the ISAF has undeniably made gains against the Taliban, this Pentagon report is a reminder of the tenacity of the insurgency and stands in stark contrast to the ambitious goals and short timetables the United States has set for itself.
U.S. forces have been on the offensive in the southern part of the country for about a year now. Preparations for the June offensive in Kandahar already are under way — for both the Taliban and the ISAF — and the surge is in the final stages of ramping up before it reaches full strength around the end of August. Yet the assessment of this report indicates the Taliban have not yet been set back significantly and are still robust — a challenge that must be addressed if the United States is to see the progress it desires by the time troops are scheduled to begin withdrawing in summer 2011.
We have outlined the Taliban’s overarching strategy, but this report gives a clear assessment of the movement’s current capabilities on a tactical level. The following are excerpts taken directly from the unclassified version of the report:
Insurgent Strengths:
- The speed and decisiveness of insurgent information operations and media campaigns remain not only the insurgents’ main effort but also their most significant strengths.
- Organizational capabilities and operational reach are qualitatively and geographically expanding.
- The ability to intimidate through targeted killings and threats in order to force acquiescence to their will.
- The strength and ability of shadow governance to discredit the authority and legitimacy of the Afghan government is increasing.
- IED use is increasing in numbers and complexity; IEDs are as much a tactic and process as they are a weapon.
- Insurgents’ tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting complex attacks are increasing in sophistication and strategic effect.
Insurgent Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities:
- The insurgency includes multiple locally-based tribal networks, as well as layered command structures, which at times can make decentralized execution difficult.
- Persistent fissures among insurgent leadership persist at the local levels.
- The insurgency is dependent on many marginalized / threatened segments of the Pashtun population.
- The insurgency is over-reliant on external support.
- Insurgent violence against civilians and respected figures can be counterproductive.
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