Did Syria send missiles to Labanon ? Is the Middle East about to enter an arms race? And what the heck is Obama doing about it?

Syria: Sending Scuds to Hezbollah?

Editor's summary: Israel has accused Syria of sending Scud missiles to Lebanon but Stratford does NOT believe whole missiles have been sent. Stratford argues that Syria does not want war with Israel. It does not have the will or the military might to wage such a war. And Israel's bigger problem, in the region, is a nuclear Iran. In the midst of all this confusion is an "ambivalent" United State, unprepared to deal with the changing face of the Mid East should the region become embroiled in an arms race. -- jds

Stratford Geo Intel Agency Report:

April 20, 2010 | 2324 GMT

DefenseImagery.mil

A Soviet SS-1 (SCUD-B)

After the United States had summoned a senior Syrian diplomat to explain Israeli allegations of a Syrian transfer of Scud missiles to Hezbollah, U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said April 20 that “we are still looking into it. We haven’t (made) any particular judgment at this point as to whether any transfer has taken place, but … this is something that we have great concern about.”

The United States is acting ambivalent about the whole affair, but STRATFOR sources in the region indicate Syria has provided Hezbollah with some components of the Scud system, but not components necessary to make the missiles operational.

Israel’s claims of a Syrian Scud transfer to Hezbollah have spread fears in the region that Lebanon, and possibly even Syria, could soon be due for another encounter with the Israeli military. But while rhetoric of war may serve the interests of all players involved, the actual likelihood of war remains low.

We need to begin with a simple assertion: If there were Scuds transferred from Syria to Lebanon, they would be highly visible via satellite imagery, and the Israeli air force would already have conducted an air strike against them. The Scud is a large, short-range ballistic missile that requires an even larger and more distinctive Transporter-Erector-Launcher vehicle. This sort of large, easily identifiable vehicle runs counter to everything Hezbollah has learned from fighting the Israelis — guerilla resistance; hidden weapons caches; and the lighter, more mobile and more concealable artillery rockets that characterized its success in 2006. Therefore, we find it difficult to believe Israel’s claim of operational Scuds being transferred to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Syria has no interest in provoking a war with Israel. The primary focus for Damascus is Lebanon, where it has made substantial progress already in re-establishing its hegemony — with Saudi, U.S., French and even Israeli acquiescence. Now that the Syrian regime feels secure about its position in Lebanon, it is finding more time to re-engage with the United States and possibly revive peace talks with Israel. Contrary to what some officials in Damascus may think, however, sending Scud parts to Hezbollah is not a very effective manner of attracting Washington’s attention. Syria simply does not have the military wherewithal to threaten Israel into a limited war and sue for peace. And sending Scud parts will not get it more than a diplomatic censure. This does not amount to a very strategic move by the Syrians.

Lebanese, Hezbollah and Syrian officials are meanwhile proclaiming that the conservative members of Israel’s Cabinet are looking for excuses to go to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon since it is being hamstrung by the United States in dealing with Iran. This argument also makes little sense. While Israel would like to eliminate Hezbollah’s weapons arsenal and undermine a key Iranian proxy in the Levant, that job is easier said than done.

Hezbollah has long been preparing itself for such a conflict and is not about to keep its missiles on targeting display for the Israeli air force. Though Hezbollah is not looking for war, it can use the threat of war to bolster its legitimacy in Lebanon as a resistance movement. Should war break out, Hezbollah’s strategy, like in 2006, would be to undermine the effectiveness of Israeli air power and draw Israeli ground troops deep into Lebanon where it can impose a war of attrition.

This is not a war that Israel wants to involve itself in now, particularly as its diplomatic image has been taking multiple hits already on its handling of Hamas, settlement building, Iran and other issues. Going to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon also does little to address the more fundamental threat for Israel: a nuclear Iran. Though the specter of war allows Israel to sustain pressure on its regional adversaries, it is unlikely to provoke a military conflict with Hezbollah to compensate for inaction on Iran.