Showing posts with label ObamaCare Reviewed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ObamaCare Reviewed. Show all posts

An ObamaCare supporter and adviser to the president, outlines his deep concerns for the implementation of the ACA fully three years before the fact. And, we are watching his fears come true.

David Matthew Cutler is the Otto Eckstein Professor of Applied Economics at Harvard University. He holds a joint appointment in the economics department and in Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and the Harvard School of Public Health. He graduated from Harvard College, summa cum laude, with a degree in Economics, and then joined the Harvard faculty after receiving his Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1991.[1] He served in the administration of Bill Clinton and was the senior health care advisor to Barack Obama.[2] From 2003-2008 Cutler was Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences for Social Sciences.


Notes:  The following letter details the problematic issues facing ObamaCare,  and why this program is going to be an absolute mess for 10 to 12 years into the future  . . . . .  an analysis designed to be helpful,  written by a friend of the Administration,  a summary written just six weeks after the signing of this bill.   This advise was almost completely ignored by an Administration that believes it can simply "declare" something to be effective and serviceable  ~ blog editor.   

May 11, 2010 

To: Larry Summers
From: David Cutler
Subject: Urgent Need for Changes in Health Reform Implementation

I am writing to relay my concern about the way the Administration is implementing the new health reform legislation. I am concerned that the personnel and processes you have in place are not up to the task, and that health reform will be unsuccessful as a result.


Let me start by reminding you that I have been a very active supporter of reform.  In addition to being the senior health care advisor to the President’s campaign,  I worked closely with the Administration,  helped Congress draft the legislation, met with countless Members of Congress and interest groups to explain the reform effort, conducted numerous radio and television interviews, walked hundreds of reporters through health care, and wrote a number of op-eds and issue briefs supporting reform. I am told that the President and senior members of the Administration valued my input, though I was never offered a position in the Administration.I say this to illustrate that I have thought about the issues a good deal and have discussed them with many people.

You should also note that while this memo is my own, the views are widely shared,including by many members of your administration (whose names I will omit but who are sufficiently nervous to urge me to write), as well as by knowledgeable outsiders such as Mark McClellan (former CMS administrator) and Henry Aaron (Brookings). Indeed, I have been at a conference on health reform the past two days, and have found not a single person who disagrees with the urgent need for action.

My general view is that the early implementation efforts are far short of what it will take to implement reform successfully. For health reform to be successful, the relevant people need a vision about health system transformation and the managerial ability to carry out that vision.The President has sketched out such a vision. However,  I do not believe the relevant members of the Administration understand the President’s vision or have the capability to carry it out.

Let me illustrate the problem you face and offer some solutions.

Problem Areas

A central concern is the Department of Health and Human Services, the main implementation agency for reform. The Department is making a good start on the immediate deliverables of reform: high risk pools and coverage for young adults. But it is far behind the curve on the key long-term reform efforts, most notably reforming the delivery system to support higher quality, lower cost care. Let me give you a few examples.

1. A good deal of reform implementation needs to occur at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). You were dealt a bad hand here. The agency is demoralized, the best people have left, IT services are antiquated, and there are fewer employees than in 1981,despite a much larger burden. Nevertheless, you have not improved the situation. The nominee to head that agency, Don Berwick has never run a provider organization or insurance company,or dealt with Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. On basic issues such as the transition from fee-for-service payment to value-based payment, Don knows relatively little. Further, he has been ordered not to be involved in anything at the agency until he is confirmed, which will likely be in the fall. Don has a wonderful vision, but there is no way he can carry it out in any reasonable time without substantial help.

Unfortunately, the senior staff at CMS, which has been appointed, is not up to the task. For example, I recently met with the senior CMS staff about how all the new demonstration and pilot programs envisioned in the legislation might work. This is a crucial issue because the  current demonstration process takes about 7 to 10 years, and thus following this path would lead to no serious cost containment for the next decade. When engaged about the speed of reform,the staff expressed the view that: 

(a) their fear was going too fast instead of going too slow; 

(b) we ought to add a layer of university review to the existing process, to be sure we are doing the right thing; and 

(c) the natural place to start demonstrations is in end-of-life care (Death Panels notwithstanding).

As a result, you have an agency where the philosophy of health system reform is not widely shared, where there is no experience running a health care organization, and where the desire to move rapidly is lacking. The result is that I have very little confidence that the Administration will make the right decisions about the direction and pace of delivery system reform.

2. The second major task of reform is to set up and run insurance exchanges. I amnot encouraged by what is occurring there either. Running exchanges is a collaborative process.  As just one example, the person who ran the Commonwealth Connector in Massachusetts estimates that he had 500 town meetings to discuss reform, the equivalent of 17,000 meetings nationally – and this was in a state where two-thirds of people, along with insurance companies, supported reform. The person newly appointed to head the insurance oversight office has a reputation as an insurance bulldog,  not a skilled facilitator. Remember that most people will get their information about reform from their doctor and their insurance agent.  If you cannot find away to work with hesitant states and insurers, reform will blow up. I have seen no indication that HHS even realizes this, let alone is acting on it.

3. A fundamental issue in making reform work is explaining reform to providers andshowing them how to respond to it. The Department has done nothing along these lines. Most providers know very little about reform, and they are universally surprised to hear a positive philosophy about how they can benefit from health system transformation. Their most common comment is ‘why hasn’t anyone explained this to us?’ As Atul Gawande’s famous  New Yorker  article put it, you need the equivalent of an agricultural extension worker in every community to make reform work. This does not appear to be on HHS’s radar screen, however.

4. Above the operational level, the process is also broken. The overall head of implementation inside HHS, Jeanne Lambrew, is known for her knowledge of Congress, her commitment to the poor, and her mistrust of insurance companies. She is not known for operational ability, knowledge of delivery systems, or facilitating widespread change. Thus, it is not surprising that delivery system reform, provider outreach, and exchange administration are receiving little attention. Further, the fact that Jeanne and people like her cannot get along with other people in the Administration means that the opportunities for collaborative engagement are limited, areas of great importance are not addressed, and valuable problem solving time is wasted on internal fights.  All in all, the administration has immense decisions to make about transforming healthcare delivery and coverage. But no one I interact with has confidence that your current personnel and configuration is up to the task. 

Some Ideas

When a corporation needs to move in a new direction, it sets up a new structure to focus on where it needs to go. You can’t change the culture by piling new responsibilities onto a broken system. I believe you need to follow this model. You need to bring in people who share the President’s vision and who know how to manage health care or other complex operations. These people then need to interact with existing agency personnel to make reform happen.

You need to start with a strong team at the White House. That team needs to lay out the milestone goals for the next 5 to 10 years, coordinate across various agencies, and communicate with the public. 

To avoid the perception of secrecy,  I would recommend an outside Board of Overseers that would monitor progress and report regularly on whether health reform is meeting its goals.

You also need a major change at HHS, which I envision as a revamped and enhanced implementation group. That group needs to share the President’s vision and have expertise in several areas:
  1.   Managing large and complex enterprises 
  2.  Payment reform, including people who can work with existing employees todesign and implement the necessary programs; 
  3. Information technology systems, including how to update the IT structure in CMS and link that to the effort to computerize medical records;
  4. Outreach, including people who can lead an education campaign for medical care providers, insurers, and insurance brokers; and  
  5.  State coordinators, who can empower and work with state-specific groups to setup and manage insurance exchanges. In each of these areas, you need to take advantage of external experts as well as people inside the Administration.


Editor’s note:  It does not appear that Obama implemented any of the five suggestions listed immediately above.  

54% of Californians may loose insurance coverage and that is just the beginning of the story.

1) California: 58,000 will lose their plans under Obamacare. The first bomb dropped in California with a mass exodus from the most populated state’s Obamacare exchange. Aetna, the country’s largest insurer, left first in July and was closely followed by UnitedHealth. Anthem Blue Cross pulled out of California’s Obamacare exchange for small businesses as well.
Fifty-four percent of Californians expect to lose their coverage, according to an August poll.
2) Missouri: Patients of the state’s largest hospital system — which spans 13 hospitals including the St. Louis Children’s Hospital — will not be covered by the largest insurer on Obamacare exchanges, Anthem BlueCross BlueShield. Anthem covers 79,000 patients in Missouri who may seek subsidies on Obamacare exchanges, but won’t be able to see any doctors in the BJC HealthCare system.
3) Connecticut: Aetna, the third largest insurer in the nation, won’t offer insurance on the Obamacare exchange in its own home state, where it was founded in 1850. The reason? “We believe the modification to the rates filed by Aetna will not allow us to collect enough premiums to cover the cost of the plans and meet the service expectations of our customers,” said Aetna spokesman Susan Millerick.

4) Maryland: 13,000 individuals covered by Aetna and its recently-purchased Coventry Health Care won’t be able to keep their insurance plans if they want Obamacare subsidies on the exchanges. Aetna and Coventry canceled plans to offer insurance in the exchange when state officials wouldn’t allow them to charge premiums high enough to cover costs.  

Editor's notes:  See the Daily Caller's commentary on the remaining 6 states,  understanding that these are not the only states in the nation affected by the rolling disaster we call "ObamaCare."  The summary reason for the exodus of nationally ranked insurance companies is found in this statement by Aetna:  “We believe the modification to the rates filed by Aetna will not allow us to collect enough premiums to cover the cost of the plans and meet the service expectations of our customers,”

Here is the scary part:  If it doesn't work for private business,  it will be nothing but a money pit when the Feds take charge.  Obama has recorded record taxation increases on the Middle Class since taking office.  ObamaCare insures this record pace to continue,  and the Socialist/Progressive theory allows for these increases,  believing that the money makes the concerns of the poor,  those who can't or  will not work to qualify themselves for life in a new and technical society.  As things stand,  today,  the poor can "earn" as much as $34,000 per year as participants in the several entitlement programs available to the so-called "poor."  







ObamaCare Reviewed - 10 benefits surveyed.

#1 - the 30 million are added to Medicare.  Obama raped Medicare of half a trillion dollars,  back in 2009,  added these 30 million,  and punted on the additional 160,000 doctors needed to care for these folks.  You  can call it "comprehensive medical coverage."  Me,  I call it Medicare and it is hardly "comprehensive."  Have fun finding  doctors who will accept this population.

#2 If  "comprehensive" is different care from others in the program,  it is penalized as a "Cadillac" policy.   Premiums will continue to rise at two and three times the rate of inflation;   coverage will be reduced in an effort to cut costs.

#3  It is what it is.  The Republican substitute also covers pre-existing conditions.

#4  Tax credits are one time events,  per employee,  and hardly offset the expense of offering coverage, especially for a long term employee.   Instead,  companies will move their employee over to Centralize Government Control or hire fewer employees.    Greeting Comrades  - you commies finally got what you want.

#5 Again,  a nonsensical "benefit" that does not offset the cost to the employer.

#6  I told you the 30 million are going into Medicare/Medicaid. It already has 39 trillion in unfunded liabilities.  What do you think 30 million additional bodies will do to this debt  -  but if you are a Democrat,  you really don't care,  right?

#7  Seems fair enough,  but did we need to 180 new federal agencies to get this done?

#8  Statistically speaking,  this particular population does not get sick.  That is why they are in the program.  Premiums are increased to family plans for young people who will not need this insurance,  typically.  And when they turn 27, ooooops,  suddenly they will have to come up with 400-550 dollars a month for individual coverage.

#9  I am a 67 year old senior and this is crap.  In fact,  we lose much of our medical deductions,  under this law and may lose our home mortgage interest deduction as Central Government tries to balance its books.  This will cost my wife and I an additional $2,000 a month on our fixed incomes.  Thanks to all the fools that supported this mess.

#10  Really.  But more and more procedures will be eliminated and a doctor's prognosis is predetermined by a board of non-professionals.  


ObamaCare Reviewed - another in our continuing series .


Without getting into any of the mechanics of the new tax/medical law, I want to demonstrate just how nonsensical is the writing of this law - no wonder no one read the thing before it was passed by the Democrats. Here is a portion of the law. As you read, imagine 2,700 pages of this gibberish and know that the panels described in the following are non-medical in their composition. Also, not one word of the following was written by a doctor or anyone in the medical profession. Understand that as one reads the larger tax law, the word "doctor" is hard to find. I am not sure the word appears in the document, certainly not in a majority sense and this is supposedly a medical bill. Clearly, this medical tax law should have, at least, been reviewed by medical personnel, but no, that did not happen.

From page 669 in the Obama Care Tax Law Concerning Medical Expending and Frugal Patient Care, found here: ObamaCare in PDF - an official explanation (hey,  its only a little over 900 pages;  enjoy ).  

My comments are [bracketed] . 

‘‘(c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Institute is to assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers 
[no "doctors." Understand that the use of the word "doctor" would require a doctor. While "clinicians" allows for "doctors," such is not required. Obama intends to use nurses and health care providers INSTEAD of doctors]

in making informed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evidence

[relevance as relates to the opinion of unqualified, not medical types concerning matters of cost control and compliance]

concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research and evidence synthesis that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the dissemination of research findings with respect to the relative health outcomes, clinical effectiveness, and appropriateness of the medical treatments, services, and items described in subsection (a)(2)(B). 
‘‘(d) DUTIES.—
‘‘(1) IDENTIFYING RESEARCH PRIORITIES AND ESTABLISHING
RESEARCH PROJECT AGENDA.—

[at the top of the list, "priorities" include cost issues as the first consideration]

‘‘(A) IDENTIFYING RESEARCH PRIORITIES.—The Institute 
shall identify national priorities for research, taking into 
account factors of disease incidence, prevalence, and burden in the United States (with emphasis on chronic conditions), 

[again, "burden" has much more to do with cost than it does with "chronic conditions" ] 

gaps in evidence in terms of clinical outcomes, practice variations and health disparities in terms of delivery and outcomes of care, the potential for new evidence to improve patient health, well-being, and the quality of care, the effect on national expenditures associated with a health care treatment, strategy, or health conditions, as . . . . . . 

[What is critical, here, is that clinical outcomes and "disparities in terms of delivery and outcomes of care" have nothing to do with the patient's doctor . . . . . . nothing. And, in every case in this tax law, the doctor is omitted from the actual decision making process except as relates to the following circumstance:    in the doctor's private practice of medicine, he no longer is free to make diagnosis that is not prescribed by a non-medical board of supervisors nor is the patient allowed to spend his own money in addition to Centralized Government Approved Insurances.  That is now illegal,  under this tax law.]