PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases offers expert analysis of the issues, background, and significance of every case slated for argument in the Supreme Court.
As part of our comprehensive coverage, the following briefs are now available online:
12-1497 Kellog Brown & Root v. United States
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
13-1032 Direct Marketing Association v. Barbara Brohl
Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration?
Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration?
13-1074 United States v. Wong
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
- Brief for the Clinic for Legal Assistance to Servicemembers and Veterans in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Paralyzed Veterans of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Jewish War Veterans of the United States, Inc., National Veterans Legal Services Program, National Defense Committee, National Coalition for Homeless Veterans in Support of Respondent
13-1075 United States v. Marlene June
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
- Brief for the Clinic for Legal Assistance to Servicemembers and Veterans in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Paralyzed Veterans of America, Military Order of the Purple Heart, Jewish War Veterans of the United States, Inc., National Veterans Legal Services Program, National Defense Committee, National Coalition for Homeless Veterans in Support of Respondent
13-1211 Hana Financial v. Hana Bank
May the jury or the court determine whether use of an older mark may be tacked to a newer one?
May the jury or the court determine whether use of an older mark may be tacked to a newer one?
13-1352 State of Ohio v. Darius Clark
1. Does an individual's obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?
2. Do a child's out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher's concerns about potential child abuse qualify as "testimonial" statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?
1. Does an individual's obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?
2. Do a child's out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher's concerns about potential child abuse qualify as "testimonial" statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?
13-1371 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project
1. Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?
2.If disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, what are the standards and burdens of proof that should apply?
1. Are disparate-impact claims cognizable under the Fair Housing Act?
2.If disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, what are the standards and burdens of proof that should apply?
- Brief for Petitioner, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, et al.
- Brief for James P. Scanlan in Support of Petitioners
- Brief for Respondent Frazier Revitalization Inc. in Support of Petitioners
13-1499 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
Does a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the First Amendment?
Does a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violate the First Amendment?
13-9972 Rodriguez v. United States
This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are "de minimis" intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.
This Court has held that, during an otherwise lawful traffic stop, asking a driver to exit a vehicle, conducting a drug sniff with a trained canine, or asking a few off-topic questions are "de minimis" intrusions on personal liberty that do not require reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to comport with the Fourth Amendment. This case poses the question of whether the same rule applies after the conclusion of the traffic stop, so that an officer may extend the already-completed stop for a canine sniff without reasonable suspicion or other lawful justification.
14-15 Amrstrong et al. v. Hettinger
1. Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against a state where Congress chose not to create enforceable rights under that statute?
2. If Medicaid providers have a private right of action, are a state's Medicaid provider reimbursement rates preempted by § 1396a(a)(30)(A) where they do not bear a reasonable relationship to provider costs and remain in place for budgetary reasons?
1. Does the Supremacy Clause give Medicaid providers a private right of action to enforce § 1396a(a)(30)(A) against a state where Congress chose not to create enforceable rights under that statute?
2. If Medicaid providers have a private right of action, are a state's Medicaid provider reimbursement rates preempted by § 1396a(a)(30)(A) where they do not bear a reasonable relationship to provider costs and remain in place for budgetary reasons?
