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PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases offers expert analysis of the issues, background, and significance of every case slated for argument in the Supreme Court.
As part of our comprehensive coverage, the following briefs are now available online:
12-1226 Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
Whether, and in what circumstances, an employer that provides work accommodations to nonpregnant employees with work limitations must provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are "similar in their ability or inability to work."
Whether, and in what circumstances, an employer that provides work accommodations to nonpregnant employees with work limitations must provide work accommodations to pregnant employees who are "similar in their ability or inability to work."
- Brief for 23 Pro-Life Organizations and the Judicial Education Project in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and a Better Balance, et al., in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Bipartisan State and Local Legislators in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Health Care Providers, the National Partnership for Women & Families, and Other Organizations Concerned With Maternal and Infant Health in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Law Professors and Women’s and Civil Rights Organizations in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Members of Congress in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the National Education Association; Service Employees International Union; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO; United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO; and American Federation of Teachers, Afl-Cio in Support of the Petitioner
- Brief for U.S. Women’s Chamber of Commerce, Greater New York Chamber of Commerce, Kingston 11 Cuisine, Learning Express, Inc., Main Street Alliance, The Shuchart Group, and Tigress Financial Partners in Support of Petitioner
12-1497 Kellog Brown & Root v. United States
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
13-352 B&B Hardware Inc., v. Hargis Industries, Inc.
1. Whether the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.
2. Whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.
1. Whether the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.
2. Whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.
- Brief for the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in Support of Neither Petitioner nor Respondents
- Brief for the International Trademark Association in Support of Neither Party
13-502 Reed v. Gilbert, Arizona
Does Gilbert's mere assertion of a lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content--based sign code content-neutral and justify the code's differential treatment of Petitioners' religious signs?
Does Gilbert's mere assertion of a lack of discriminatory motive render its facially content--based sign code content-neutral and justify the code's differential treatment of Petitioners' religious signs?
13-553 Alabama Department of Revenue and Julie Magee v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Whether a State "discriminates against a rail carrier" in violation of 49 U.S.C. §11501(b)(4) when the State generally requires commercial and industrial businesses, including rail carriers, to pay a sales-and-use tax but grants exemptions from the tax to the railroads' competitors.
Whether a State "discriminates against a rail carrier" in violation of 49 U.S.C. §11501(b)(4) when the State generally requires commercial and industrial businesses, including rail carriers, to pay a sales-and-use tax but grants exemptions from the tax to the railroads' competitors.
- Brief for Alabama Cities and Counties, City of Mobile et al. in Support of Petitioners
- Brief for Multistate Tax Commission in Support of Petitioners
13-684 Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans
Does a borrower exercise his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of Section 1635 by "notifying the creditor" in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must a borrower file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?
Does a borrower exercise his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of Section 1635 by "notifying the creditor" in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must a borrower file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?
- Brief for Respondents, Countrywide Home Loans, et. al.
- Brief for the American Bankers Association, American Financial Services Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Consumer Mortgage Coalition, Independent Community Bankers of America, and Mortgage Bankers Association, in Support of Respondents
13-935 Wellness International Network v. Sharif
1. Whether the presence of a subsidiary state property law issue in a 11 U.S.C. § 541 action brought against a debtor to determine whether property in the debtor's possession is property of the bankruptcy estate means that such action does not "stem[] from the bankruptcy itself” and therefore, that a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional authority to enter a final order deciding that action.
2. Whether Article III permits the bankruptcy courts to exercise the judicial power of the United States over claims against a debtor where the debtor has consented to the exercise of such judicial power by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy relief. In addition, this case also presents the two questions currently before the Court in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013) (No. 12-1200). Because of the procedural posture of Executive Benefits-there the district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order de novo-it is possible that the Court may conclude that no constitutional violation occurred and thus, not reach the issues on which certiorari was granted. In such event, this case presents the opportunity to address those questions, about which there is also a split among the circuits:
3. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by the bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and if so, whether implied consent based on a litigant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
4. Whether bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a "core" proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
1. Whether the presence of a subsidiary state property law issue in a 11 U.S.C. § 541 action brought against a debtor to determine whether property in the debtor's possession is property of the bankruptcy estate means that such action does not "stem[] from the bankruptcy itself” and therefore, that a bankruptcy court does not have the constitutional authority to enter a final order deciding that action.
2. Whether Article III permits the bankruptcy courts to exercise the judicial power of the United States over claims against a debtor where the debtor has consented to the exercise of such judicial power by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy relief. In addition, this case also presents the two questions currently before the Court in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013) (No. 12-1200). Because of the procedural posture of Executive Benefits-there the district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's summary judgment order de novo-it is possible that the Court may conclude that no constitutional violation occurred and thus, not reach the issues on which certiorari was granted. In such event, this case presents the opportunity to address those questions, about which there is also a split among the circuits:
3. Whether Article III permits the exercise of the judicial power of the United States by the bankruptcy courts on the basis of litigant consent, and if so, whether implied consent based on a litigant's conduct is sufficient to satisfy Article III.
4. Whether bankruptcy courts have the statutory authority to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by a district court in a "core" proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
- Brief for National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees in Support of Petitioners
- Brief for United States in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the American College of Bankruptcy in Support of Reversal
- Brief for the Business Law Section of the Florida Bar in Support of Neither Party
13-975 T-Mobile South v. Roswell, Georgia
May a document from a state or local government stating that an application has been denied, but providing no reasons whatsoever for the denial, satisfy this statutory "in writing" requirement?
May a document from a state or local government stating that an application has been denied, but providing no reasons whatsoever for the denial, satisfy this statutory "in writing" requirement?
13-1010 M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett
1. When construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, may courts presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should courts require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold?
2. Do, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of construction apply when determining whether health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans versus collectively bargained plans.
1. When construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, may courts presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should courts require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold?
2. Do, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of construction apply when determining whether health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans versus collectively bargained plans.
13-1019 Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC
Whether and to what extent may a court enforce the EEOC's mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit?
Whether and to what extent may a court enforce the EEOC's mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit?
13-1032 Direct Marketing Association v. Barbara Brohl
Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration?
Whether the TIA bars federal court jurisdiction over a suit brought by non-taxpayers to enjoin the informational notice and reporting requirements of a state law that neither imposes a tax, nor requires the collection of a tax, but serves only as a secondary aspect of state tax administration?
- Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Council on State Taxation in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for the Institute for Professionals in Taxation in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for NCIB Small Business Legal Center, Association of National Advertisers, Netchoice, Electronic Retailing Association, and American Catalog Mailers Association, Inc., in Support of Petitioner
- Brief for Tax Foundation in Support of Petitioner
13-7120 Johnson v. United States
May mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun be treated as a violent felony under the armed career criminal act?
May mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun be treated as a violent felony under the armed career criminal act?
13-7211 Jennings v. Stephens
1. Did the Fifth Circuit err in reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment stage of a death penalty trial by deferring to a state court prejudice determination that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent?
2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the state court reasonably determined that trial counsel made a sound strategic decision not to present any evidence of petitioner's disadvantaged background in a capital case where, in its absence, the jury was deprived of meaningful mitigating evidence that could have resulted in a life sentence?
3. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the federal doctrine of waiver precludes a federal habeas court from considering an argument made initially in a footnote in a state court brief that was not waived under state law?
4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent's appeal?
1. Did the Fifth Circuit err in reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment stage of a death penalty trial by deferring to a state court prejudice determination that was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent?
2. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the state court reasonably determined that trial counsel made a sound strategic decision not to present any evidence of petitioner's disadvantaged background in a capital case where, in its absence, the jury was deprived of meaningful mitigating evidence that could have resulted in a life sentence?
3. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that the federal doctrine of waiver precludes a federal habeas court from considering an argument made initially in a footnote in a state court brief that was not waived under state law?
4. Did the Fifth Circuit err in holding that a federal habeas petitioner who prevailed in the district court on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must file a separate notice of appeal and motion for a certificate of appealability to raise an allegation of deficient performance that the district court rejected even though the Fifth Circuit acquired jurisdiction over the entire claim as a result of the respondent's appeal?
13-7451 Yates v. United States
Was Mr. Yates deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term "tangible object" is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying "tangible object" in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?
Was Mr. Yates deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, where the term "tangible object" is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying "tangible object" in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?
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