PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases offers expert analysis of the issues, background, and significance of every case slated for argument in the Supreme Court.
As part of our comprehensive coverage, the following briefs are now available online:
12-1497 Kellog Brown & Root v. United States
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
13-352 B&B Hardware Inc., v. Hargis Industries, Inc.
1. Whether the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.
2. Whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.
1. Whether the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion precludes Hargis from relitigating that issue in infringement litigation, in which likelihood of confusion is an element.
2. Whether, if issue preclusion does not apply, the district court was obliged to defer to the TTAB's finding of a likelihood of confusion absent strong evidence to rebut it.
13-553 Alabama Department of Revenue and Julie Magee v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
Whether a State "discriminates against a rail carrier" in violation of 49 U.S.C. §11501(b)(4) when the State generally requires commercial and industrial businesses, including rail carriers, to pay a sales-and-use tax but grants exemptions from the tax to the railroads' competitors.
Whether a State "discriminates against a rail carrier" in violation of 49 U.S.C. §11501(b)(4) when the State generally requires commercial and industrial businesses, including rail carriers, to pay a sales-and-use tax but grants exemptions from the tax to the railroads' competitors.
13-1041 13-1052 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Association
13-1041 - Whether a federal agency must engage in notice--and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.
13-1052 - Whether agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are categorically prohibited from revising their interpretative rules unless such revisions are made through notice-and--comment rulemaking.
13-1041 - Whether a federal agency must engage in notice--and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.
13-1052 - Whether agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are categorically prohibited from revising their interpretative rules unless such revisions are made through notice-and--comment rulemaking.
- Reply Brief for the Federal Petitioners
- Reply Brief for Petitioners, Jerome Nickols, Ryan Henry, and Beverly Buck
- Brief for State and Local Government Associations in Support of Respondent
13-1074 United States v. Wong
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
- Brief for the American Association for Justice in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Professor Gregory C. Sisk in Support of Respondent
13-1075 United States v. Marlene June
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
May the two-year time limit for filing an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b), be subject to equitable tolling?
- Brief for the American Association for Justice in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Arizona Association for Justice/Arizona Trial Lawyers Association in Support of Respondent
- Brief for the National Center for Law and Economic Justice and the Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Professor Gregory C. Sisk in Support of Respondent
- Brief for the Southeastern Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent
13-1174 Gelboim, et al. v. Bank of America Corp
Whether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other suits immediately appealable?
Whether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other suits immediately appealable?
13-9026 Whitfield v. United States
Whether § 2113(e)'s forced-accompaniment offense requires proof of more than a de minimis movement of the victim.
Whether § 2113(e)'s forced-accompaniment offense requires proof of more than a de minimis movement of the victim.
No comments:
Post a Comment