PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases offers expert analysis of the issues, background, and significance of every case slated for argument in the Supreme Court.
As part of our comprehensive coverage, the following briefs are now available online:
12-1497 Kellog Brown & Root v. United States
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
1. Whether the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act--a criminal code provision that tolls the statute of limitations for "any offense" involving fraud against the government "[w]hen the United States is at war," 18 U.S.C. § 3287, and which this Court has instructed must be "narrowly construed" in favor of repose--applies to claims of civil fraud brought by private relators, and is triggered without a formal declaration of war, in a manner that leads to indefinite tolling.
2. Whether, contrary to the conclusion of numerous courts, the False Claims Act's so called "first-to-file" bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)--which creates a race to the courthouse to reward relators who promptly disclose fraud against the government, while prohibiting repetitive, parasitic claims--functions as a "one-case-at-a-time" rule allowing an infinite series of duplicative claims so long as no prior claim is pending at the time of filing.
13-628 Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky v. John Kerry, Secretary of State
Is a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in "Israel" on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport unconstitutional on the ground that the statute "impermissibly infringes on the president's exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him"?
Is a federal statute that directs the Secretary of State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born in "Israel" on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport unconstitutional on the ground that the statute "impermissibly infringes on the president's exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him"?
13-684 Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans
Does a borrower exercise his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of Section 1635 by "notifying the creditor" in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must a borrower file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?
Does a borrower exercise his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of Section 1635 by "notifying the creditor" in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must a borrower file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?
13-895 and 13-1138 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama and Alabama Democratic Conference, et al., v. The State of Alabama, et al.
(13-895)
Whether Alabama's legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.
(13-1138)
(a). Whether, as the dissenting Judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
(b). Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?
(13-895)
Whether Alabama's legislative redistricting plans unconstitutionally classify black voters by race by intentionally packing them in districts designed to maintain supermajority percentages produced when 2010 census data are applied to the 2001 majority-black districts.
(13-1138)
(a). Whether, as the dissenting Judge concluded, this effort amounted to an unconstitutional racial quota and racial gerrymandering that is subject to strict scrutiny and that was not justified by the putative interest of complying with the non-retrogression aspect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act?
(b). Whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring such a constitutional claim?
13-975 T-Mobile South v. Roswell, Georgia
May a document from a state or local government stating that an application has been denied, but providing no reasons whatsoever for the denial, satisfy this statutory "in writing" requirement?
13-983 Elonis v. United States
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a "reasonable person" would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort?
Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a "reasonable person" would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of last resort?
13-1010 M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett
1. When construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, may courts presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should courts require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold?
2. Do, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of construction apply when determining whether health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans versus collectively bargained plans.
1. When construing collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, may courts presume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), as the Sixth Circuit holds; or should require a clear statement that health-care benefits are intended to survive the termination of the collective bargaining agreement, as the Third Circuit holds; or should courts require at least some language in the agreement that can reasonably support an interpretation that health-care benefits should continue indefinitely, as the Second and Seventh Circuits hold?
2. Do, as the Sixth Circuit has held in conflict with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, different rules of construction apply when determining whether health-care benefits have vested in pure ERISA plans versus collectively bargained plans.
13-1041 13-1052 Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association and Nickols v. Mortgage Bankers Association
13-1041 - Whether a federal agency must engage in notice--and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.
13-1052 - Whether agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are categorically prohibited from revising their interpretative rules unless such revisions are made through notice-and--comment rulemaking.
13-1041 - Whether a federal agency must engage in notice--and-comment rulemaking before it can significantly alter an interpretive rule that articulates an interpretation of an agency regulation.
13-1052 - Whether agencies subject to the Administrative Procedure Act are categorically prohibited from revising their interpretative rules unless such revisions are made through notice-and--comment rulemaking.
- Brief for Respondent, Mortgage Bankers Association, et al.
- Brief for the Cato Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, and the Judicial Education Project in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Health Care Association, Business Roundtable, National Association of Manufacturers, and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association in Support of Respondents
- Brief for National Federation of Independent Business, American Farm Bureau Federation, American Petroleum Institute, National Association of Home Builders, and Retail Litigation Center in Support of Respondents
- Brief for the National Mining Association in Support of Respondent
- Brief for United Air Regulatory Group and American Forest & Paper Association in Support of Respondent
- Brief for Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Respondent
13-1080 Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
Does § 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 effect an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private entity?
Does § 207 of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 effect an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a private entity?
13-1174 Gelboim, et al. v. Bank of America Corp
Whether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other suits immediately appealable?
Whether and in what circumstances is the dismissal of an action that has been consolidated with other suits immediately appealable?
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