Is reform needed? Midknight Review thinks "maybe." Is this 1,300 page bill the ticket to that reform? If it does not include Fannie and Freddie, if it does not deal with the issues of "affordable housing" high risk (redistributive) lending policy, if it ignores the derivatives market, how can it be considered the "answer" to any all-encompassing "solution?" The bill is presented (by Obama) as that which will prevent another financial collapse, yet, even to this layman, it does not address anything that is central to past causes or future possibilities. The whole of Obama legislative strategy is childish in its assumption that wholesale reform can take place in four weeks or can be managed into reality by ideologues within a particular political party. In the end, when Obama is finally defeated, his legacy will be thousands of pages of legislation that accomplishes nothing but the benefit of a chosen few and puts our grandchildren in debt beyond resolution - that is the fear of those who oppose this Mad Man who occupies our White House. - jds
Here is the Heritage Foundation's 14 point critique. It is amended for the sake of this post.
Read the full review here: 14 Fatal Flaws
- Creates a protected class of “too big to fail” firms. “Designating large non-bank financial companies as too big to fail will be like creating Fannies and Freddies in every area of the economy.”[1]
- Provides for seizure of private property without meaningful judicial review. The bill, in Section 203(b), authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to order the seizure of any financial firm that he finds is “in danger of default” and whose failure would have “serious adverse effects on financial stability.” This determination is subject to review in the courts only on a “substantial evidence” standard of review, meaning that the seizure must be upheld if the government produces any evidence in favor of its action. This makes reversal extremely difficult.
- Creates permanent bailout authority. Section 204 of the bill authorizes the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to “make available … funds for the orderly liquidation of [a] covered financial institution.”
- Establishes a $50 billion fund to pay for bailouts. Funding for bailouts is to come from a $50 billion “Orderly Resolution Fund” created within the U.S. Treasury in Section 210(n)(1), funded by taxes on financial firms. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the ultimate cost of bank taxes will fall on the customers, employees, and investors of each firm.[3]
- Opens a “line of credit” to the Treasury for additional government funding. Under Section 210(n)(9), the FDIC is effectively granted a line of credit to the Treasury Department that is secured by the value of failing firms in its control, providing another taxpayer financial support.
- Authorizes regulators to guarantee the debt of solvent banks. Bailout authority is not limited to debt of failing institutions. Under Section 1155, the FDIC is authorized to guarantee the debt of “solvent depository institutions” if regulators declare that a liquidity crisis (“event”) exists.
- Limits financial choices of American consumers. The bill contains a new “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection” with broad powers to limit what financial products and services can be offered to consumers. this will make credit more expensive and harder to get.[4]
- Undermines safety and soundness regulation. Decisions of the new bureau would not be subject to approval by the Fed. New rules could be stopped only through a cumbersome, after-the-fact review process involving a council of all the major regulatory agencies. This could impede efforts of economic (or “safety and soundness”) regulators to ensure the financial stability of regulated firms, as the new, independent “consumer” regulator would establish rules that conflict with that goal.
- Enriches trial lawyers by authorizing consumer regulators to ban arbitration agreements.
- Subjects firms to hundreds of varying state and local rules. Section 1044 limits pre-emption of state and local rules, subjecting banks and their customers to confusing, costly, and inconsistent red tape imposed by regulators in jurisdictions across the country.
- Subjects non-financial firms to financial regulation. As a result, a broad swath of private industry may find itself ensnared in the financial regulatory net. As Zerzan explains: “An airplane manufacturer that holds customer down payments for future delivery, a large home improvement chain that invests its profits as part of a plan to increase revenues, and an energy firm that makes markets in derivatives are all engaged in ‘financial activities’ and potentially subject to systemic risk regulation.”
- Imposes one-size-fits-all reform in derivative markets. It would require most derivative contracts to be settled through a clearinghouse rather than directly between the parties. Yet derivatives are already increasingly being traded on clearinghouses thanks to private efforts coordinated by the New York Fed.[6]
- Allows activist groups to use the corporate governance process for issues unrelated to the corporation or its shareholders. The process can . . . be used by labor unions, politicians who manage public pension funds, and others to force corporations to respond to pet social or political causes.
- Does nothing to address problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. These two government-sponsored housing giants helped fuel the housing bubble. When it popped, taxpayers—because of an implicit guarantee by the U.S. Treasury—found themselves on the hook for some $125 billion in bailout money. Not only has little of this amount been paid back, but the Treasury Department recently eliminated the cap on how much more Fannie and Freddie can receive. Yet the bill does nothing to resolve the problem or reform these government-run enterprises.
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