Midknight Review's appraisal of the war on terror - with a little help from Stratfor.

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Thanks to Steady Drip for image. Story is ours.
The chart shows previous concerns with regard to various statements of the Administration's Homeland Security in its early stages in 2009. It demonstrates that time was lost while the Administration busied itself with ignoring the real war on terror and went after American conservatives, returning military, lecturers, those who carried conservative symbols and signs. Nearly all segments of our society were named by Janet Napolitano's crack crime fighting agents with one glaring exception: no mention whatsoever of Islam or militant jihadists.

From an October, 2008 report, Stratfor seemed somewhat encouraged. The implicit implications of this October reporting include the notion that the Bush strategy of carrying the "war on terror" to Iraq was successful. Midknight Review has reported that this battlefield has seen the deaths of between 40,000 (a military estimate) and 80,000 (civilian reporting) al Qaeda terrorists. The Iraqi people have grown weary of the death and destruction caused by the invading terrorist organization and have been increasingly involved in the effort at defeating al Qaeda. Indeed, al Qaeda has moved on, for the most part.

Reports by American politicians that al Qaeda has actually grown stronger because of Bush war strategies are disingenuous, at best, and woefully uninformed. The military campaign in Iraq has been one of the most successful war efforts in modern American history. Only a handful of militant terrorist thugs roam that nation. American military deaths are almost none existent (no deaths recorded in December, for example). Military deaths total approximately 3600 (in Iraq) over the course of the nearly 7 years we have been there. That's 3,600 deaths against 1.5 million individual and different U.S. soldiers involved in the battle. Remarkable. What is most important is this: Mr. Obama has been handed a very successful military effort in Iraq. The terrorists could come back to that country just as quickly as they left. Our withdrawal, something Bush worked for, needs to be measured and strategic, affording our departure while leaving that country stronger than it was before we came. We are happy to that it does appear as though Obama has gotten that memo !!

Stratfor gives us this review of the terrorist circumstance:

Many analysts supportive of the view that al Qaeda has strengthened tend to lump the entire jihadist world into one monolithic, hierarchical organization. Others, like STRATFOR, who claim al Qaeda’s abilities have been degraded over the years, define the group as a small vanguard organization and only one piece of the larger jihadist pie. From STRATFOR’s point of view, al Qaeda has evolved into three different — and distinct — entities. These different faces of al Qaeda include:

1. The core vanguard group: Often referred to by STRATFOR as the al Qaeda core, al Qaeda prime or the al Qaeda apex leadership, this group is composed of Osama bin Laden and his close trusted associates. These are highly skilled, professional practitioners of propaganda, militant training and terrorism operations. This is the group behind the 9/11 attacks.
2. Al Qaeda franchises: These include such groups as al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although professing allegiance to bin Laden, they are independent militant groups that remain separate from the core and, as we saw in the 2005 letter from al Qaeda core leader Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, there can be a great deal of tension and disagreement between them and the al Qaeda core. These regional franchises vary in size, level of professionalism and operational capability.
3. The broader grassroots jihadist movement: This group includes individuals and small cells inspired by al Qaeda but who, in most cases, have no contact with the core leadership.

We believe, as we did last summer, that the core al Qaeda group has weakened and no longer poses the strategic threat to the U.S. homeland that it did prior to 9/11. However, this does not mean it is incapable of re-emerging under less pressured circumstances.

On the franchise level, some groups — such as AQIM, the Yemen franchises and the franchises in Pakistan and Afghanistan — have gained momentum over the past few years. Others — such as those in Iraq, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the Sinai Peninsula and Morocco — have lost steam. In our estimation, this ebb and flow has resulted in a constant threat on the franchise level, though the severity has migrated geographically as groups wax and wane in specific regions. The franchises have done little to expand their operations outside of their regions of interest and to conduct attacks against the “far enemy” — that is, attacks in the United States or Europe.

So goes Stratfor's reporting in October of '08, less than a month before the presidential election. That was then, this is now:

Startfor reviews it's 2009 observations with [in part] these comments:

Overall, our 2009 forecast was fairly accurate. As noted above, we wrote that the United States would continue its operations to decapitate the al Qaeda core and that this would cause the group to be marginalized from the physical jihad, and that has happened.

While we missed forecasting the resurgence of jihadist militant groups in Yemen and Somalia in 2008, in our 2009 forecast we covered these two countries carefully. We wrote that the al Qaeda franchises in Yemen had taken a hit in 2008 but that they could recover in 2009 given the opportunity. Indeed, the groups received a significant boost when they merged into a single group that also incorporated the remnants of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, which had been forced by Saudi security to flee the country. We closely followed this new group, which named itself al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and STRATFOR was the first organization we know of to discuss the threat AQAP posed to civil aviation when we raised this subject on Sept. 2 and elaborated on it Sept. 16, in an analysis titled Convergence: The Challenge of Aviation Security. That threat manifested itself in the attempt to destroy an airliner traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 — an operation that very nearly succeeded . . . . . . . . As we watched Pakistan for signs that it was becoming a failed state, we noted that the government was actually making considerable headway in its fight against its jihadist insurgency. Indeed, by late in the year, the Pakistanis had launched not only a successful offensive in Swat and the adjacent districts but also an offensive into South Waziristan, the heart of the TTP’s territory.

We also forecast that the bulk of the attacks worldwide in 2009 would be conducted by regional jihadist franchise groups and, to a lesser extent, grassroots jihadists, rather than the al Qaeda core, which was correct.

In relation to attacks against the United States, we wrote that we did not see a strategic threat to the United States from the jihadists, but that the threat of simple attacks against soft targets remained in 2009. We said we had been surprised that there were no such attacks in 2008 but that, given the vulnerabilities that existed and the ease with which such attacks could be conducted, we believed they were certainly possible. During 2009, we did see simple attacks by grassroots operatives in Little Rock, Arkansas, and at Fort Hood, Texas, along with several other grassroots plots thwarted by authorities.

Startfor's terrorist/al Qaeda forecast for 2010:

In the coming year we believe that, globally, we will see many of the trends continue from last year. We believe that the al Qaeda core will continue to be marginalized on the physical battlefield and struggle to remain relevant on the ideological battlefield. The regional jihadist franchise groups will continue to be at the vanguard of the physical battle, and the grassroots operatives will remain a persistent, though lower-level, threat.

One thing we noticed in recent months was that the regional groups were becoming more transnational in their attacks, with AQAP involved in the attack on Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia as well as the trans-Atlantic airliner bombing plot on Christmas Day. Additionally, we saw HUJI planning an attack against the Jyllands-Posten newspaper and cartoonist Kurt Westergaard in Denmark, and on Jan. 1, 2010, a Somali man reportedly associated with al Shabaab broke into Westergaard’s home armed with an axe and knife and allegedly tried to kill him. We believe that in 2010 we will see more examples of regional groups like al Shabaab and AQAP reaching out to become more transnational, perhaps even conducting attacks in the United States and Europe.

We also believe that, due to the open nature of the U.S. and European societies and the ease of conducting attacks against them, we will see more grassroots plots, if not successful attacks, in the United States and Europe in the coming year. The concept behind AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi’s article calling for jihadists to conduct simple attacks against a variety of targets may be gaining popularity among grassroots jihadists. Certainly, the above-mentioned attack in Denmark involving an axe and knife was simple in nature. It could also have been deadly had the cartoonist not had a panic room within his residence. We will be watching for more simple attacks.

As far as targets, we believe that they will remain largely the same for 2010. Soft targets such as hotels will continue to be popular, since most jihadists lack the ability to attack hard targets outside of conflict zones. However, jihadists have demonstrated a continuing fixation on attacking commercial aviation targets, and we can anticipate additional plots and attacks focusing on aircraft.

Regionally, we will be watching for the following:

• Pakistan: Can the United States find and kill the al Qaeda core’s leadership? A Pakistani official told the Chinese Xinhua news agency on Jan. 4 that terrorism will come to an end in Pakistan in 2010, but we are not nearly so optimistic. Even though the military has made good progress in its South Waziristan offensive, most of the militants moved to other areas of Pakistan rather than engage in frontal combat with Pakistan’s army. The area along the border with Pakistan is rugged and has proved hard to pacify for hundreds of years. We don’t think the Pakistanis will be able to bring the area under control in only one year. Clearly, the Pakistanis have made progress, but they are not out of the woods. The TTP has launched a number of attacks in the Punjabi core of Pakistan (and in Karachi) and we see no end to this violence in 2010.
• Afghanistan: We will continue to closely monitor jihadist actors in this war-torn country. Our forecast for this conflict is included in our Annual Forecast 2010, published on Jan. 4.
• Yemen: We will be watching closely to see if AQAP will follow the normal jihadist group lifespan of making a big splash, coming to the notice of the world and then being hit heavily by the host government with U.S. support. This pattern was exhibited a few years back by AQAP’s Saudi al Qaeda brethren, and judging by the operations in Yemen over the past month, it looks like 2010 might be a tough year for the group. It is important to note that the strikes against the group on Dec. 17 and Dec. 24 predated the Christmas bombing attempt, and the pressure on them will undoubtedly be ratcheted up considerably in the wake of that attack. Even as the memory of the Christmas Day attack begins to fade in the media and political circles, the focus on Yemen will continue in the counterterrorism community.
• Indonesia: Can Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad find an effective leader to guide it back from the edge of destruction after the death of Noordin Mohammad Top and the deaths or captures of several of his top lieutenants? Or will the Indonesians be able to enjoy further success against the group’s surviving members?
• North Africa: Will AQIM continue to shy away from the al Qaeda core’s targeting philosophy and essentially function as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat with a different name in Algeria? Or will AQIM shift back toward al Qaeda’s philosophy of attacking the far enemy and using suicide bombers and large vehicle bombs? In Mauritania, Niger and Mali, will the AQIM-affiliated cells there be able to progress beyond amateurish attacks and petty banditry to become a credible militant organization?
• Somalia: We believe the factionalism in Somalia and within the jihadist community there will continue to hamper al Shabaab. The questions we will be looking to answer are: Will al Shabaab be able to gain significant control of areas of the country that can be used to harbor and train foreign militants? And, will the group decide to use its contacts within the Somali diaspora to conduct attacks in East Africa, South Africa, Australia, Europe and the United States? We believe that al Shabaab is on its way to becoming a transnational player and that 2010 may well be the year that it breaks out and then draws international attention like AQAP has done in recent months.
• India: We anticipate that Kashmiri jihadist groups will continue to plan attacks against India in an effort to stir-up communal violence in that country and stoke tensions between India and Pakistan — and provide a breather to the jihadist groups being pressured by the government of Pakistan.

As long as the ideology of jihadism survives, the jihadists will be able to recruit new militants and their war against the world will continue. The battle will oscillate between periods of high and low intensity as regional groups rise in power and are taken down. We don’t believe jihadists pose a strategic geopolitical threat on a global, or even regional, scale, but they will certainly continue to launch attacks and kill people in 2010.

From the "for what its worth" department, Midknight Review makes commentary:

Whether Obama follows Stratfor or not, his military advisors most certainly do. To date, Midknight Review has not been impressed with the Obama war effort. His problem? From our perspective, he is compromised politically. While that compromise could be much worse than it is, it may be effecting the his ability to wage as successful an anti-terrorist campaign as possible. Anything less than "as possible" is profoundly inadequate, by the way.

Obama finds himself in the same situation as Jimmy Carter and for much of the same reason. Obama is, in truth, a principled anti-war politician. Clinton was "anti-war," as well, but not principled in that opinion. As Carter was then, Obama now finds himself the Commander in Chief of one of the most effective military forces in world history. That is problematic. The problem is two-fold:

First, he does not know who his enemies are. Certainly he understands that the Taliban poses the immediate threat in Afghanistan, but they have complicated the war effort in that region by moving into the border areas of Pakistan. There is little talk from the Obama camp with regard to al Qaeda at a time when al Qaeda by be rebuilding in Yemen and his $900 million gift to Hamas last spring tells us that he has no clue as to the terror situation living on the borders of Israel. He understands that N Korea is a difficult situation but believes that Chavez in Venezuela and Putin in Russia bear no military threat to their surrounding regions and/or the United States. Obama continues to ignore the increasing military threat in South America (i.e. Chavez's preparations to import several hundred Russian made missiles) . There is no increased diplomatic efforts in that region and absolutely no mention of the increasing military threat we have noted. Nothing. Ditto for Imperialistic Russian and Putin's desire to reconstitute Soviet Russia.

Secondly, Obama, before becoming president, came from the same camp as the individual who wrote this:

I don’t really give a fig personally about US soldiers who die. Those US soldiers voluntarily chose the profession of hired killers. They kill for thrills and money, not because they are defending their country. I care about civilians, especially children, of any nationality or religion. I realise, however, that most Americans are infected with racism and nationalism and care only about American deaths and then only white ones, so I will gladly post any photos you can find of US casualties to pound home the cost of this war in suffering to Americans too.

This is why we worry about Mr. Obama. His friends are trying to pull him "back onto the reservation." They not only do not care about the American soldier, they do not care about American casualties. "War" for these Woodstockers is an unpleasant figment of the imagination - guess that is why they do not "give a fig" about who dies, as long as it is an American.

Because his mentality is "anti-war" (in the political sense), he is slow to respond to the military and terrorist threats that he and his buds have spent a lifetime refusing to admit exists. Because he is the Commander and Chief, like it or not, his dilemma is compounded and his compromise is more evident -- to wit, he must not do what he has to do. How that plays out is critical to the well being of this country and our security on the world's stage. The fact that this is the problem adds to the notion that he must not be re-elected.

(c) Midknight Review
J Smithson, editor

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